Paper Topics

Extradition doctrine should distinguish territorial fugitives from telemedicine providers who never entered the demanding State; Doran's summary process applies only after that historically grounded threshold is proved.

Shield States should use declaratory judgments strategically: Baker requires nationwide recognition of final judgments while leaving enforcement methods local, creating a narrower and more defensible shield than refusal to honor sister-state law.

Gorsuch identifies a constitutional ratchet: once Congress delegates power by ordinary legislation, presidential veto power makes retrieval unusually difficult; courts should therefore tighten nondelegation review when removal protection is absent.

The concurrence's Progressive Era origin story overstates the causal role of Wilsonian theory and understates earlier multimember administration, weakening its claim that modern agencies are an alien constitutional settlement.

Gorsuch's acquiescence in at-will presidential removal rests on an unrealistic remedial premise: courts will compensate by overturning the nondelegation settlement and related doctrines. Because that reconstruction is far harder than the concurrence admits, the paper should test whether its institutional rationale is pretextual by comparing its promised counterweights with Gorsuch's votes when those counterweights are actually presented.

Mathews should require an independent security-cleared reviewer and a usable statement of reasons whenever travel is denied, because internal redress cannot reliably expose identity errors or stale predictive judgments.

Courts should separate listing from remedy: due process can require periodic validation and burden-shifting after a prima facie error without constitutionalizing a right to see every intelligence source.

Callais should not migrate to the Thirteenth Amendment: its substantive ban reaches private slavery directly, and Jones's badges-and-incidents power rests on text and history unlike derivative Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment rights.

Jones needs a limiting principle after Callais; Congress should have to identify a historically traceable badge of slavery and build findings connecting the regulated practice to that badge, not merely invoke present racial disparity.

Physical presence and prolonged custody, not statutory 'admission,' trigger procedural due process. But the vacated panel's fixed 90-day rule is too crude; courts should require a bond hearing when delay becomes unreasonable under factors tied to flight risk, danger, and responsibility for delay.

The panel confused procedure with substance: because § 1225(b)(2)(A) makes admission status—not dangerousness or flight risk—the fact authorizing detention, a bond hearing cannot correct factual error relevant to the statute. Any constitutional limit should instead sound in substantive due process and confront Congress's categorical judgment directly.

Bruen undermines Bach's premise that public carry is not fundamental; Article IV should require every shall-issue State to offer nonresidents a functional permit path, though not automatic reciprocity.

The historical analogue inquiry should distinguish domicile-based militia duties from ordinary peaceable carry; residency rules survive only when tied to verification and enforcement needs that cannot be met through less discriminatory means.

Individualization is not a free-standing equal-protection right; it depends on the level of scrutiny. B.P.J. permits general fit under intermediate scrutiny, but strict scrutiny's narrow-tailoring requirement can make a feasible individual exception constitutionally necessary unless the State proves that exceptions would defeat its compelling interest.

Sports should not receive an unexplained constitutional exception. Its category-dependent structure may justify rejecting individualized exemptions, but only if the same administrability principle applies across other competitive programs and the State proves that objective screening is unworkable; otherwise 'sports' is a policy intuition, not a doctrinal rule.

Louisiana's sovereign-interference theory should fail unless federal action legally disables state enforcement. Making violations easier through third parties is a generalized enforcement burden; treating it as injury would give States standing to challenge almost any federal deregulatory choice they oppose.

Louisiana's documented Medicaid payments are concrete proprietary injuries, but traceability should require patient-level proof connecting the 2023 REMS change, out-of-state prescribing, and the State's expenditure. That evidence-based rule distinguishes Louisiana from Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine without reviving special solicitude.

Associational standing is defensible as authorized representation, but Article III should require identified injured members and governance evidence showing that the litigation reflects their interests, not merely the organization's agenda.

After Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, Havens should be limited to direct interference with an organization's existing services; self-chosen advocacy expenditures should never create injury because that converts disagreement into standing.

Havens should be overruled, not repeatedly distinguished: an organization cannot manufacture Article III injury by choosing to spend money counteracting conduct that frustrates its mission. The paper must assess ramifications for fair-housing enforcement and public-interest litigation, then test substitutes such as injured-member suits, statutory enforcement rights, and government actions.

CASA changed procedural form more than remedial scope: plaintiffs have substituted Rule 23(b)(2) classes, State plaintiffs, and APA vacatur, leaving geographically broad relief common but more procedurally supervised.

The substitutions reveal CASA's institutional payoff: channeling broad relief through representative procedures improves notice, adequacy review, and appellate records without preventing courts from protecting everyone whose rights cannot practically be separated.

The police-power label is too broad; history supports a bounded necessity privilege, so deliberate destruction of an innocent third party's property should be compensable unless officials prove imminent danger and reasonable necessity.

Compensation should turn on public cost allocation rather than officer fault: a statutory indemnity remedy can preserve emergency discretion while preventing randomly selected owners from financing a public arrest operation alone.

Professional licensing may require exposure to state-selected information, but only when the curriculum is germane to demonstrated professional competence; ideological attitude reform exceeds that rationale and triggers heightened scrutiny.

The better line protects private course designers, not attendees: the State may define license-credit subjects, but it cannot conscript independent instructors to voice a prescribed viewpoint when equivalent state-authored training is available.

Registration jurisdiction is unconstitutional discrimination when domestic corporations receive a practical home-forum limitation that foreign corporations surrender as the price of market entry; Pike balancing alone understates the defect.

After National Pork Producers, litigation expense and forum exposure are insufficient dormant-Commerce burdens absent discrimination or market regulation; Congress, not courts, should create a national jurisdiction rule for interstate firms.

The 100-mile regulation defines statutory authority, not Fourth Amendment reasonableness; device searches away from the functional border should require individualized suspicion even when brief immigration questioning would not.

Courts should replace the basic/forensic device distinction with a data-exposure test keyed to cloud access, deleted files, and duration, producing a rule that is technologically stable and administrable at checkpoints.

Gore's guideposts survive Dobbs because they enforce procedural notice and lawful adjudication, but courts should abandon any free-floating cap on ratios unsupported by the defendant's opportunity to anticipate punishment.

If punitive-damages proportionality is substantive, Dobbs destabilizes it; the more coherent protection is the Excessive Fines Clause when punishment serves public purposes, supplemented by de novo review of jury instructions.

Gap-filling doctrines are legitimate only when supported by structural entailment, historical settlement, and remedial necessity; that framework strongly supports federal contract protection but exposes weaknesses in broad sovereign immunity.

Constitutional symmetry is an unreliable source of rights: federal equal protection should rest on specific Fifth Amendment interests and federalism constraints rather than an assumed mirror image of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The 'primary purpose' test is too manipulable; a bill raises revenue whenever its operative provision is reasonably expected to fund general government beyond administering the program that imposes the charge.

The Senate's amendment power should permit substitution only when the House bill supplies a genuine revenue subject, because a shell bill defeats the Clause's accountability function even if bicameralism is formally satisfied.

After National Pork Producers, nationwide compliance effects do not establish extraterritoriality; the constitutional trigger should be a State's attempt to control an AI decision lacking a user, subject, or harmful effect in the State.

Ordinary duplication is not a Pike burden: firms can comply with several disclosure, audit, or impact-assessment regimes at once. A serious dormant-Commerce claim arises when States require mutually inconsistent model-wide design or output rules, making compliance with one State's law violate another's; courts can test that conflict without balancing speculative costs against benefits.

Plyler is best understood as an anti-caste rule against imposing an irreversible civic disability on children for parental conduct; that rationale extends to compulsory-age digital access and foundational special education.

Plyler should remain limited to basic K-12 access, but States invoking fiscal necessity must prove marginal costs and a lawful alternative; unsupported aggregate immigration costs cannot satisfy even its unusual heightened rationality review.

Plyler was wrongly decided and should be overruled: unlawful status is not suspect, education is not fundamental, and rational-basis review permits a State to deter unlawful immigration by withholding a costly benefit. Consequentialist fear of an underclass cannot justify making a hash of equal-protection doctrine; a defensible paper must still confront children’s innocence, reliance, federal preemption, and transition costs.

Post-Jarkesy analysis should turn principally on remedy and historical analogue, not the public-rights label; agency-imposed money designed to punish or substitute for legal restitution requires a jury.

Sripetch exposes the next line: disgorgement remains equitable only when it is victim-linked and restorative; once payable to the Treasury or untethered to an invaded private interest, it becomes legal relief under the Seventh Amendment.

The state-law survey will show that resident preferences are least defensible where constitutions or statutes treat the shore as a statewide public resource. In those States, municipal exclusions are trustee self-dealing; where access is locally funded or privately owned, more limited preferences may survive.

Use the survey to identify which States make beach access an incident of state citizenship, then argue that the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause protects that state-created privilege against municipal discrimination among the State's citizens. The theory should not constitutionalize access that state law withholds from everyone.

Congress may protect a post-120-day caretaker from at-will removal because Morrison and Perkins permit good-cause tenure for an inferior officer who remains subject to the Attorney General’s direction.

Congress should amend § 546 to bar successive interim appointments and evasive delegations while permitting removal for misconduct, incompetence, or refusal to obey lawful written DOJ directives.

Slaughter should be confined to principal officers: presidential control over a supervised inferior officer may rest on direction and review rather than unrestricted removal.

J.D.B. commits the Court to a race corollary it cannot disown: if a characteristic apparent to the officer may enter an objective test, race qualifies, and Alvarado is distinguishable because race requires no inquiry into individual history.

The custody and seizure inquiries should diverge: Miranda's threshold is arrest-equivalence, its remedy is a warning rather than suppression of physical evidence, and its governing premise is already sociological, so the objections that bite in Carter do not bite here.

The Knotts public-roads rationale cannot survive plate-to-device deanonymization: a system that names the phone in your pocket tracks persons, not vehicles, and Chatrie supplies the rule of decision.

The search occurs at fusion, not collection: combining two lawfully gathered datasets to produce identity is itself a Fourth Amendment event, just as geofence anonymity ends at step three.

Broadcast wireless identifiers are not "voluntarily conveyed" under Smith; Kyllo's sense-enhancement principle, not the third-party doctrine, should govern what police may capture with an antenna.

Under Gorsuch's property approach, device identifiers are "effects," and the pen-register and wiretap statutes already reach MAC-address capture — courts need not wait for privacy-expectations doctrine.

Because a government-owned archive involves no compelled disclosure, SignalTrace lets police engineer around Chatrie's warrant requirement — proof the Fourth Amendment must regulate query and use, not merely collection.

Good-faith reliance and passenger-standing gaps mean suppression can never discipline surveillance networks; civil declaratory actions like Schmidt should be the primary constitutional check.

he commerce power attaches to interstate transactions, not permanently to objects; when transportation and distribution end and an article enters settled local use, its later possession becomes intrastate activity.

The Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes local possession regulation only when possession bears a demonstrable instrumental relationship to regulating interstate trade, not merely to suppressing crime or dangerous conduct.

Congress’s power to regulate commerce among the states includes continuing authority over goods introduced into national markets because effective regulation of interstate distribution may require control after those goods reach local possessors.

Congress may regulate intrastate possession of market commodities whenever it rationally determines that exemptions would impair national control of supply, demand, substitution, or diversion, without a transaction-specific temporal nexus.